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This paper explores the expression of multiple social identities through coordinated
collective action. We propose that perceived compatibility between potentially
contrasting identities and perceived legitimacy of protest serve as catalysts for collective
action. The present paper maps the context of the “Euromaidan” anti-regime protests
in Ukraine and reports data (N = 996) collected through an online survey following
legislation to ban protests (March–May, 2014). We measured participants’ identification
with three different groups (the Ukrainian nation, the online protest community, and the
street movement), perception of compatibility between online protest and the street
movement, perception of the legitimacy of protest, and intentions to take persuasive and
confrontational collective action. We found evidence that the more social groups people
“stood for,” the more they “fought” for their cause and that identifications predicted
both forms of collective action to the degree that people saw the protest and the
online movement as compatible with each other and believed protest to be legitimate.
Collective action can be interpreted as the congruent expression of multiple identities
that are rendered ideologically compatible both in online settings and on the street.
Keywords: multiple social identities, perceived compatibility, perceived legitimacy of protest, collective action,
political activism
INTRODUCTION
A very relevant issue to address when examining the dynamics of grass-roots collective action
is what type of commitments drive individuals’ behavior and how the real-world structural
context conditions collective efforts to attain social change. Although collective action is routinely
understood as efforts by members of a disadvantaged social group to overturn an injustice, the
concept itself suggests the need to look beyond a single, nominal social category membership as the
seed of dissent toward contested and multifaceted political agency and, thus, multiple politicized
collective identities as a potential explanation of the drivers of social movements for social change.
Did the Russian revolution of 1917 establish the dictatorship of the proletariat? Are efforts 100 years
later to “make America great again” directed to the benefit of all (US) Americans? Perhaps, but it
also seems plausible that in these, and many other cases, that there is a number of salient social
categories that may be relevant at the same time for either a community or the same individual
actor. The multiplicity of actors, political agendas and group identities are likely to achieve higher
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mobilization power in certain contexts, and social psychological
models of collective action should be able to account for effects of
such multiple identities.
The present research is designed to answer specific questions
about how identification with distinct social groups coheres
to underpin engagement in coordinated collective action. In
particular, we aim to understand the process through which
multiple social identities of self are translated into synchronized
political action as well as conditions under which people opt
for different forms of collective action. We seek to understand
this phenomenon in relation to the wave of political activism in
Ukraine starting in 2014.
Psychological research (as highlighted in this Topic) has
demonstrated that people belong to a number of social
groups and affiliations that can be potentially mobilized and
politicized and has posited the question of whether these multiple
commitments of self can lead to a synchronized expression (e.g.,
Cruwys et al., 2016; Curtin et al., 2016). Despite the increasing
interest the underlying mechanisms of the expression of multiple
identities remain unspecified.
The matter is complicated further because social movements
may reflect not only multiple agendas but multiple methods.
Some of these methods involve building support by persuading
potential supporters to join a movement whereas others involve
disrupting or even destroying opposition. Scholars have sought
to understand the causes of extreme, non-normative and violent
collective action (e.g., Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009; Thomas
and Louis, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014; Becker and Tausch,
2015; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015; Shuman et al., 2016) by
distinguishing them from moderate, normative, and peaceful
action. We appreciate that all of these distinctions have merit for
various purposes In this study, we rely on the distinction between
persuasive action –as a form of protest with the primary purpose
of influencing/persuading third parties (or even opponents) to
share a political goal and confrontational action, conceived as a
form of protest that confronts opponents with direct action that
may disrupt their activities. The advantage of this distinction
is that labels for action such as “non-normative,” “unlawful,”
“violent,” and “extreme” are subject to locally applicable
definitions that are often within the power of authorities to
define. This is generally problematic where those authorities are
themselves the targets of action, but is specifically problematic
where forms of protests are outlawed during the course of a
campaign. In Tunisia in early 2010 street protests were both
illegal and very uncommon (McGarty et al., 2014). Protests
continued to be illegal right through to the point that the Ben
Ali regime was overthrown but they had become common right
across the country by early January 2011. In Ukraine in 2013/14
public demonstrations, most famously in the Maidan Square in
Kyiv, had become regular and heavily supported events, but in
January of 2014 they were declared to be illegal, prompting a new
wave of intensified protests.
A recognition of context in promoting and constraining
the expression of social identities has prompted analysis of
the perception of political opportunities in relation to the
anticipated outcomes of protest efforts (e.g., Williams, 2004;
Reicher and Haslam, 2013; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans,
2013). However, little attention has been paid to the role of the
perception of legitimacy of protest in predicting different forms
of collective action.
The present research readdresses these issues and suggests
a framework for understanding the expression of multiple
social identities situated in a specific historical context. The
key objective of the present research is, therefore, to examine
the mechanisms behind a synchronized expression of multiple
social identities in explaining persuasive and confrontational
collective action. In line with the social identity approach, we first
propose that collective action can be explained to a greater extent
by accounting for multiple social identities whose ideological
contents are aligned rather than by focusing on a singular salient
category membership (hence the title of this paper ‘the more
we stand for – the more we fight for’). In particular, based on
self-expansion theory (Aron and Aron, 1996; Aron et al., 2004),
we assume that people expand their self-concepts to include
different identities of groups and communities they belong to,
and this can occur without individuals necessarily incorporating
or nesting one social identity into another. This psychological
process, also referred to as the inclusion of other in the self, is
thought to be achieved through an increasing overlap between the
representations of self and social groups (e.g., Tropp and Wright,
2001).
Secondly, we argue that the ideological content of these
identities need to be (or become) compatible with each other in
order for them to drive collective action (see Bliuc et al., 2012;
McGarty et al., 2014). We thus suggest that holding a shared
(civic) vision based on the perceived compatibility of multiple
identities provides solid psychological ground for engaging in
collective action.
Another important consideration, in addition to the
compatibility between identifications, is the degree to which the
political opportunity structure (e.g., Tarrow, 1998; Meyer, 2004),
that is, system-level constraints of individual-level intentions to
take collective action, imposes a particular set of expectations
regarding the ways in which those multiple identities may be
expressed. In other words, if the norm that protest is a legitimate
way of engaging in collective action is aligned with multiple
identities, then the perception of protest as legitimate will help
explain the effects of these identities on collective action. This is a
particularly timely and contextually relevant operationalization,
capturing people’s perception of a key feature of the political
opportunity structure in contested times of transition.
Compatibility of Multiple Identities and
Political Activism
The idea that collective action may be explained through
politicization of multiple social identities has recently received
more attention in collective action research (e.g., Curtin and
McGarty, 2016; Curtin et al., 2016; Louis et al., 2016; building
on earlier insights by Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon and Ruhs,
2008).
It has been argued that the psychological processes behind the
simultaneous expression of multiple identities might involve the
formation of opinion-based groups (see McGarty et al., 2009),
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where the content of commitments (what ‘we’ stand for and
what ‘we’ stand against, see Chayinska et al., in press), rather
than strength and salience of social identification, has been
shown to be the key factor to understanding politicization and
action engagement. Smith et al. (2015b; see also Smith et al.,
2015a) conceptualize this as the formation of an identity-norm
nexus where people come to see shared views about how to
change the world as an aspect of self. Qualitative analysis by
Curtin et al. (2016) also revealed that individuals who experience
marginalization and privilege at the same time, and arguably
identify with advantaged and disadvantaged groups, tend to
simultaneously express these multiple identities to the extent
to which these identities may be subsumed under a broader
identity category (i.e., interpretable as involving commitment to
a common cause).
Turner-Zwinkels et al. (2015) have shown that politicization
of social/personal identities is not merely a matter of increasing
allegiance to multiple political agendas; it is the overlap in
the normative content of these identities and a subjective
internalization of their agendas through which the political
becomes personal that predicts commitment and action.
Similarly, Louis et al. (2016) contend that one of the reasons why
activism in one domain (i.e., identification with Cause 1) might
predict and facilitate the likelihood of activism in other domain
(i.e., identification with Cause 2) is the ideological or normative
alignment between these movements. According to these authors,
it is therefore necessary to explicitly measure whether and how
such a normative consensus leads to collective action.
Other scholars have highlighted that a meaningful
interconnectedness of available multiple identities (e.g., Case
et al., 2012; Greenwood, 2012) or so called ‘identity-value fit’
(e.g., Kutlaca et al., 2016) tends to facilitate their simultaneous
expression, and that holding a number of social commitments,
as opposed to a sparse social identity profile, is beneficial to life
transitions. However, there appears to be one crucial condition:
the multiple identities one holds need to be perceived to be
compatible with each other (e.g., Benet-Martinez and Haritatos,
2005; Riketta and Nienaber, 2007; Iyer et al., 2009).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the more people
perceive their multiple social identities to be compatible the
higher the level of identity integration. Conversely, the perception
of two or more identities being in opposition to each other,
perhaps due to conflicting values and norms, signals a lower
level of identity integration. We extend this line of research by
suggesting that that expression of multiple politicized identities
through collective action is more likely to occur when individuals
do not have to make an ‘either–or’ choice between two or more
commitments. In other words, when a high level of identity
integration between multiple identities is present, thus when
identities are perceived as more compatible, collective action is
more likely to emerge.
Based on this literature review, we suggest that the greater
the degree of normative or ideological compatibility between
multiple social identities the more likely it is that they will
lead to coordinated collective action for the same cause. Thus,
the present study investigates the potential mediating role of
perceived identity compatibility in the relationships between
the identification with the online protest community and street
movement and intentions to take persuasive and confrontational
collective action. We conceptualize perceived compatibility
between multiple identities as the extent to which their content
(and the values assigned to it) are perceived at the individual level
to be coherent and in congenial combination with one another.
In other words, for multiple identities to be psychologically
compatible, we assume, the identification with one social group
must not be perceived as conflicting with identification with
another group.
While we see ideologies as a perfectly viable basis for the
formation of social identities (most obviously in relation to
political groupings such as socialist and fascist) our focus here on
the link between ideology and identity is chiefly in terms of the
perceived compatibility of identities as they relate to participation
in protest. Thus one pro-democracy, pro-European protester
may hold an ideological commitment to non-violence or to
obeying national laws (even when they are seen to be unjust) and
another might believe that democratic ends justify violent means,
or that ‘bad’ laws need to be broken. We turn to these matters
now.
Perceived Legitimacy of Protest
It has been widely accepted that the context within which
politicized collective identities emerge plays an important role
in the understanding of political collective action and its
consequences. Past research has paid insufficient attention to the
fact that the legitimacy of engaging in protest against authorities
or for a particular cause is itself a very contested aspect of social
structure, and therefore varies across political contexts. Although
it is commonly taken for granted in liberal democratic settings
that political structures accommodate the right for participation
in protest, this is not true in most parts of the world throughout
history. This pattern may potentially challenge the cross-cultural
applicability of findings from Western democratic contexts to
other contexts where transition between political regimes and
democratization is an ongoing process and challenging reality.
Some political science research (e.g., Tarrow, 1998; Meyer,
2004; Corcoran et al., 2011) indicates significant links between
democratization and protest such that a change in some
dimensions of the political opportunity structure tends to affect
an individual perception of the feasibility of protest. For instance,
analyzing the data from the World Values Survey, Corcoran et al.
(2011) have revealed that the perception of political institutions as
open (a macro-level factor) affected individuals’ sense of efficacy
(a micro-level factor), which in turn was found to determine
intentions to take collective action. Social psychological research
illustrated these processes in the analysis of McGarty et al. (2014)
looking at the protests against repressive regimes in North Africa
in 2010 and 2011. In this context, protest came to be seen as
feasible after striking novel images of anti-regime protest were
recorded on camera phones, uploaded to social media video
sharing sites (e.g., YouTube), and from there, broadcast through
external satellite television networks (Al Jazeera) to citizens in
Tunisia and Egypt. Arguably in this context online mobilization
was not alienated from street protest but was a precondition
for it: part of a broader global pattern that Castells (2012)
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describes as the occupation of specific online spaces preceding the
occupation of physical public spaces. Also, McGarty et al. (2014),’
research captures the transition in people’s perception that protest
is “allowed,” and the agency with which actors expanded this
legitimacy of protest from the online to the street contexts.
Perceiving protest to be a legitimate political act is likely
to result in collective action involving conventional, persuasive
forms of action, but perhaps less so in the more confrontational
forms of action (e.g., Simon et al., 1998; Thomas and Louis,
2014; Becker and Tausch, 2015). In the present study we examine
whether perception of protest as a legitimate instrumental
tool to achieve social change may also be rooted in the
process that governs expression of multiple politicized identities.
Specifically, we suggest that the ideological alignment (i.e.,
perceived compatibility) between different social identities along
with perceiving protest as legitimate will explain how the
relevant politicized identities will generate collective action.
These processes are assumed to explain why and how multiple
identities may align to predict engagement in collective action.
In other words: ‘the more we stand for’ (multiple identities),
‘the more we fight for’ (increased collective action), because
ideologically ‘we’ are fighting for the same goals (perceived
compatibility) and because ‘we’ perceive our actions in protest as
legitimate (perceived legitimacy of protest).
Current Study
We tested these ideas in the context of the 2014 Euromaidan
movement – an uprising against the refusal of the then Ukrainian
national government to sign the Association Agreement with
the European Union. After a set of pro-Western protests – the
Russian-aligned majority of the Parliament of Ukraine passed
a set of anti-protest laws that included measures limiting street
assemblies and internet freedoms (Cohen, 2014). The new laws,
criminalized all unauthorized meetings and gatherings in public
places, and the online dissemination of “extremist information”
(without providing a clear definition of ‘extremist,’ Centre for
Civil Liberties, 2014). In the space of a few months, the political
opportunity structure changed: the legitimacy of protests came to
be contested in the midst of a political identity crisis of allegiances
toward Ukraine, Europe or the Russian-led Customs Union
among protesting Ukrainians. This is an especially intriguing
context because of the legislative change. A growing social
movement that sought to promote closer ties with Western
Europe was confronted with new laws that made both street
and online protest illegal. Obviously, however, street protests
remained more detectable and punishable by authorities and 82
of street protesters were killed, more than 1,100 injured and
234 arrested in the period after the new laws were introduced
(Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, 2014).
We captured this moment in this study, looking at whether
and how participation in an online protest movement become an
acceptable alternative to street protest, whether online activism
may represent the legitimate continuation of the protest by
other means in order to preserve the future of Ukraine, or
whether online protest become an unsatisfactory and alienated
substitute: expressing what Morozov (2009, 2011), Gladwell
(2010) and others might deride as slacktivism, clicktivism or even
in Morozov’s terms “the net delusion” (see Schumann and Klein,
2015; Thomas et al., 2015).
We tested a model in which perceived identity compatibility
and perceived legitimacy of protest mediate the relationships
between multiple identities and collective action. We expected
that, in the context of anti-government protest, people may find
that there are more than one group or community that best
represents their interests, and if they perceive that the values of
these several groups are compatible (not conflicting), they will be
likely to express their joint claims on behalf of those communities
(the more we stand for – the more we find for).
We included three different social identifications as predictors
of action: identification with the street protest movement,
identification with the online protest movement, and Ukrainian
national identification. We expected all three to be relevant
predictors but the inclusion of national identification allowed
us to address the possibility that identification with the single
most relevant existing social category could provide an adequate
(and parsimonious) account. Ethnic identification in terms of
Ukrainian and Russian heritage represented other alternatives
to measure single identities, and may seem obvious choices to
external observers in view of recent dramatic conflicts in Ukraine.
However, the civic ideology of the modern Ukrainian state (in
which most participants would have been socialized) eschewed
categorizations based on ethnicity in favor of a wider national
identity category (see Prizel, 1998).
We expected that both persuasive and confrontational
forms of collective action would flow from identification
with the three different social identities (identification with
Ukraine, identification with the online protest community, and
identification with the Euromaidan street movement). Moreover,
perceived compatibility and perceived legitimacy are expected to
explain the effects of multiple identities on collective action. We
generally also expected that the predictive power of the model
including multiple identities and perceived compatibility and
legitimacy will be stronger for persuasive than confrontational
forms of collective action. This is because when considering
persuasive collective actions, people are more likely to act out of a
coherent ideological alignment between their multiple identities
and the normative beliefs about these identities and about protest.
When it comes to confrontational forms of collective action, this
alignment between identities and normative beliefs might not be
necessary. We tested these hypotheses with survey data collected
during the 2014 protests.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Procedure
Participants were approached through a public online survey
posted to Facebook pages that were generally discussing political
events in Ukraine. The data were collected between March 28 and
April 30, 2014, (as soon as possible after the January 26 passage of
laws that restricted people’s right to protest led to larger protests
in Ukraine). The questions of the survey focused on socio-
demographics and attitudes toward current political issues. The
items were available in separate Ukrainian and Russian versions
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of the survey instrument. In order to guarantee coherence and
validity of the questions, all items were translated from English to
Ukrainian/Russian and back using a standard translation-back-
translation procedure (Brislin, 1970). Participants were required
to be of Ukrainian nationality and aged over 18.
In total, the responses from 996 participants were used in
the data analysis. The sample ranged in age from 18 to 77
(Mage 33.87 years, SD = 9.61) and comprised 51.7% women.
Participants were highly educated (57.4% having graduated from
university), 44.2% were employed full time, and 57% indicated
Ukrainian as their first language. Some 72.7% reported that they
completed this survey while in Ukraine, 24.7% – while living
abroad (mostly in European countries, 15.5%, and in North
America, 4.4%).
Measures
Socio-Demographics
Participants indicated age, gender, ethnicity, country of birth,
current residence, prior experience of living abroad, educational
level, employment status, and mother tongue (i.e., Ukrainian,
Russian, other).
Identification with Online Protest Community and the
Street Movement
We measured self-expansion with the online protest community
and with the street movement using a modified Inclusion-of-the-
Other in-the-Self-Scale (the IOS-scale, Aron et al., 1992). The IOS
task depicted five pairs of circles (numbered one to five), ordered
by degrees of increasing overlap between the pairs. Self-expansion
refers to a “fundamental human motivation to enhance potential
self-efficacy (which is the ability to accomplish desired goals by
attaining) greater material, social, and informational resources”
(Aron and Aron, 1996; Aron et al., 2004). Participants were
asked to indicate how close they felt toward online protest
community and street movement, respectively, by selecting one
of the five pairs of circles. Higher numbers are indicative of a
smaller felt distance between oneself and others participating in
the movement.
Identification with Ukraine
Six items from Leach et al. (2008) were used to measure
identification with Ukraine. These and other measures below
used five point Likert scales labeled from 1 (Strongly disagree)
to 5 (Strongly agree). These items captured Leach et al. (2008)
dimensions of centrality (e.g., “I often think about the fact that I
am a part of the Ukrainian people”), satisfaction (e.g., “I am glad
to be part of Ukraine”), and solidarity (e.g., “I feel solidarity with
people in Ukraine”) of identity, that comprise the second order
dimension of group-level self-investment and are considered to
be particularly important for collective political action. The items
were averaged to form a composite measure of identification with
Ukraine [Cronbach’s alpha (α)= 0.95].
Perceived Compatibility
To measure perceived compatibility between the online protest
community and the street movement we used four items
adapted and modified from Riketta and Nienaber (2007): ‘this
online community is another platform for the street protest,’
‘by becoming members of Online Protest Community people
safeguard the very existence of the street protest,’ ‘in general, the
mission statement of Online Protest Community fits well with the
mission statement of the street protest,’ and ‘the ideas of Online
Protest Community concerning interaction and cooperation
correspond to the ideas of the street protest’), α= 0.79.
Perceived Legitimacy of Protest
Beliefs about legitimacy of protest were assessed using a 6 item
scale: ‘These people were wasting their time protesting (recoded),’
‘I think protesting on the streets was a valid form of behavior in
Ukraine,’ ‘Protesting changed nothing (recoded),’ ‘I think this was
irresponsible behavior (recoded),’ ‘I think there should be more
protests in Ukraine,’ ‘This was not typical Ukrainian behavior,’
α= 0.71.
Persuasive and Confrontational Collective Action
Respondents were asked to indicate how willing they were to
participate in 10 different offline collective actions. Principal
components analysis yielded two components with eigenvalues
greater than 1 that accounted for 55.45% of the variance.
Loadings, after oblique rotation, revealed that relatively non-
violent, persuasive actions (e.g., ‘voice group’s claims in social
network pages,’ ‘display symbolic attributes (flags, stripes) of
my group, ‘participate in marches and motorcades,’ ‘donate
money for the cause of my group,’ ‘compile a blacklist (list for
lustration, sanctions),’ and ‘participate in flash-mobs and art
events organized to support the cause of your group’) loaded
primarily on the first component (41.10%); seemingly extremely
confrontational actions (e.g., ‘blockade activity of ideological
opponents,’ ‘sneer at opponents’ symbolic attributes (e.g., flags),’
‘participate in mock political funerals,’ ‘sabotage political events
of opponents’) loaded on the second component (14.35%). The
items were averaged to yield composites of individual’s likelihood
to engage in persuasive (α= 0.84) and extremely confrontational
(α = 0.70) collective action. The two scales were moderately
correlated (r = 0.592, p< 0.001).
RESULTS
Statistical Analyses
The preliminary analyses involved bivariate analysis and
hierarchical multiple regression. In this step, predictor variables
were centered when computing interaction terms to minimize
colinearity. The main analysis involved a test of the mediational
model. Data analyses were performed using SPSS 24 and Amos
24. Fit statistics, including χ2 test (which can be affected by
sample size), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA),
comparative fit index (CFI), and Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) were evaluated (Kline, 2011). The standardized paths
between the variables included in the model were examined. The
magnitude of effect sizes for the regression paths was determined
as 0.10, 0.30, and 0.50 for small, medium, and large effects
(Cohen, 1992). A p-value of less than 0.05 was considered to be
statistically significant in all of the analyses.
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Preliminary Analysis: Do Multiple
Politicized Identities Predict Collective
Action?
Data screening was performed to ensure there were no violations
of the assumptions. The descriptive statistics and bivariate
correlations are presented in Table 1.
First, we performed a hierarchical multiple regression analyses
to test whether identification with several politicized categories
predicts collective action better than one salient identity and
whether interaction terms should be included in a final model
along with main effects1. Overall, the regression analyses
indicated that multiple identities have additive positive effects on
both types of collective action (on persuasive collective action,
adjusted R2 = 0.403, on confrontational: adjusted R2 = 0.132)
and that adding perceived compatibility and perceived legitimacy
of protest significantly improved the explanatory power of both
models, respectively, adjusted R2 = 0.49, 1F(2,994) = 89.41,
p < 0.001, and adjusted R2 = 0.153. 1F(2,994) = 13.03. Details
of the regression analyses are available from the corresponding
author.
Main Analyses: Do Compatibility and
Legitimacy Mediate the Effects of
Multiple Identities on Participants’
Intentions to Engage in Persuasive and
Confrontational Collective Action?
We tested a model in which perceived legitimacy and
compatibility were considered as possible mediators of the
effects of the three forms of identification on persuasive and
confrontational action. Correlated error terms were allowed at
each layer of the model. After the initial runs, we adjusted the
models by setting two paths that had non-significant regression
weights in the original models to zero, in particular the paths
from the street movement identity to perceived compatibility
1The preliminary analysis includedcentred interaction terms between each of the
two identities (i.e., identification with the online protest community and with the
street movement), and perceived compatibility, as well as perceived legitimacy of
protest. In fact the only significant interaction term was in the model explaining
persuasive collective action where the interaction of the effect of identification
with the online protest community and perceived compatibility was significant:
β= 0.08, p= 0.037. For reasons of parsimony and in view of the high power derived
from the large sample size we do not consider these interaction effects in the main
analyses.
(β = 0.03, p = 0.207) and from the Ukrainian identity to
confrontational collective action (β = 0.01, p = 0.738). Figure 1
shows the adjusted fitting model. The values for this final model
fall within the cut-offs as advocated by Bentler and Bonett
(1980) indicating good model’s fit: χ2(2) = 1.594, p = 0.451,
CFI = 1.000, RMSEA= 0.000 (confidence interval: Low= 0.000,
High= 0.043), PCLOSE= 0.978, AIC = 67.594.
The final model shows that identification with the street
movement was a significant direct predictor of both persuasive
and confrontational action and that identification with the
online protest movement was a direct predictor of only
persuasive action. Ukrainian national identification was an
indirect predictor of both forms through perceived legitimacy
and compatibility.
DISCUSSION
This study explored the mechanisms by which multiple identities
predict collective action. First, we found empirical support to our
hypothesis that collective action can be explained to a greater
extent by accounting for multiple social identities with potentially
aligned contents rather than by focusing on a singular salient
category membership (‘the more we stand for – the more we
fight for’). Importantly, these relationships were found to be
significant for both persuasive and confrontational forms of
collective action.
The effects of identification with the online protest community
are noteworthy. In particular, we found that both persuasive and
confrontational collective action were predicted by identification
with the online protest community due to increased perceptions
of compatibility between the online and the street protest, but
also due to the higher perception that protest is legitimate. These
findings are intriguing as they contribute to the ongoing research
on political participation through the Internet (e.g., Schumann
and Klein, 2015; Thomas et al., 2015), which has been criticized as
a low-cost and low-risk activism lacking commitment and social
impact (e.g., Morozov, 2009; Gladwell, 2010). Our results indicate
an alignment of identification with different groups, irrespective
of the online-offline divide, and perceived compatibility between
identifications and the perceived legitimacy of protest seems to
equally and independently predict collective action.
In our case there was no evidence that online protest was
seen to be a defective or unsatisfactory form of action even
TABLE 1 | Correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables (N = 996).
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD
1 Identification with Ukraine − 0.274 0.263 0.317 0.475 0.402 0.179 4.49 0.96
2 Identification with OPC − 0.396 0.383 0.359 0.467 0.306 3.26 1.14
3 Identification with SM − 0.216 0.357 0.524 0.297 2.84 1.13
4 Perceived compatibility between OPC and SM − 0.406 0.425 0.228 3.77 0.87
5 Perceived legitimacy of protest − 0.550 0.287 4.33 0.76
6 Persuasive collective action − 0.592 3.73 0.89
7 Confrontational collective action − 2.74 1.04
OPC, online protest community; SM, street movement, all correlations p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 1 | Path analysis. Model for the pathways to persuasive and confrontational collective action via perceived compatibility and perceived legitimacy of
protest. Figure contains standardized parameter estimates, all p < 0.001. Non-significant paths are shown as broken arrows.
alongside widely disseminated images of street protests that
were globally distributed. It is important to bear in mind
though that in Ukraine in 2014, as in other parts of the
world, both online dissent and street protest were illegal. The
Ukrainian government may have unwittingly increased the value
of online dissent by banning it at the beginning of 2014,
in the midst of the political crisis. Additionally, the online
community of protestors offered a platform for the Ukrainian
diaspora to become involved, whereas their participation in
the street protests was logistically difficult if not entirely
impossible. Future research may examine longitudinal changes
in the relationships between multiple identities across various
platforms of collective action, using individual-level analysis to
track people’s enduring participation in fighting for a common
cause.
Secondly, our data revealed that, beyond the direct effect of
multiple identities, the perceived compatibility between them
adds to our understanding of people’s engagement in collective
action and explains the effects of identifications with the online
community and with Ukraine. What “we stand for” and how we
“stand for” the multiple communities we belong to (online, at the
more abstract level of the national community), is of equal if not
additional importance to our single memberships in any of them.
Our study contributes to the theoretical discussion regarding the
role of normative overlap between the agendas of different social
groups in explaining cross-domain activism (e.g., Curtin et al.,
2016; Louis et al., 2016) and long-term commitment to political
causes (e.g., Smith et al., 2015b; Turner-Zwinkels et al., 2015).
The results offer the interpretation that participation in collective
action came to express national identification where Ukrainians
saw protest as the right (legitimate) thing to do and where they
perceived online and street protest to be compatible.
There was a seemingly paradoxical effect consistent with the
perceived compatibility between street and online community
identities mediating the effects of national identification on
collective action but not the effects of street movement
identification. In other words, the connection of the street
Euromaidan movement with action was direct, so that supporters
of the movement took to the streets. The connection of national
identification with collective action, however, appeared to be
indirect. In other words, the clear pathway between Ukrainian
identification and collective action rested on perceiving the
street movement and online movement were compatible with
each other, because, we surmise that these two identities were
themselves held to be valid expressions of Ukrainian identity
(from the perspective of those supporters). We cannot know in
retrospect whether that compatibility was a specific element that
was relevant to the contested context of a nation that, at the time
of data collection, was on the precipice of civil war or whether
these patterns would obtain more broadly.
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One possible way of thinking about these findings is that
a capacity to form, synthesize, politicize and merge several
opinion-based groups centered on short-/medium-term issues
into a multi-goal campaign may serve as a key factor to
understanding the processes behind coalition buildings and
global activism. This also helps us understand the failures
of mobilization: when networked campaigns use a vague
idea-framing and related ideological noise that cannot justify
involvement for a global cause, thus failing to bring people
together. At the individual level, failure to cohere multiple
group memberships into concerted collective action could be
explained by exactly this lack of ideological overlap and miss-
specification of the identity-norm nexus (Smith et al., 2015b).
Although the present study was not designed to explicitly
measure a link between formation of identities with overlapping
injunctive contents and coordinated collective action, we believe
that the curvilinear nature of this relationship requires a further
examination.
Finally, consistent with our expectations, we found that
expression of multiple social identities through collective action
was also explained by individual perceptions of legitimacy of
protest. Specifically, our findings indicate that higher degrees
of identification with all politicized identities led to increased
perceptions of protest as a legitimate method for achieving social
change, and thus to higher likelihood of engaging in persuasive
and confrontational collective action. In fact, our theoretical
analysis helped us to identify and test this intriguing puzzle
within the context of Ukraine, in the immediate aftermath of
the introduction of criminal penalties for political dissent. The
revealed pattern is important as it suggests that recognizing
both between-group and inter-personal variations in people’s
beliefs about protest (and incorporating the concept of perceived
legitimacy of protest in collective action research) can help
explain more general processes of choosing tactics from a
spectrum of possibilities within a repertoire of contention. It
is noteworthy to highlight that the effects of identifying with
the street protest were only mediated by the perceptions of
protest legitimacy and not by perceiving identity compatibility.
Capturing people’s perceptions of protest legitimacy is also a
way of operationalizing people’s engagement with the political
opportunity structure, at times of political change and transition.
This is much needed for developing a more dynamic theoretical
model of the multiple links between identity and politics in
constantly changing political environments.
Our findings raise other important questions: whether and
under what conditions radicalization (confrontational political
action) emerges from activism (non-violent political action)? To
what extent do the tactics that one employs depend on political
circumstances (e.g., legal criminalisation of dissent) and will
variations in perceived legitimacy of protest produce similar
patterns of collective behavior in both liberal and developing
democracies? In other words, if variances in the perception
of legitimacy of protest can help explain particular cases, can
this conceptual approach generate testable models that hold
across contexts? The answers are beyond the scope of this
paper, but one factor may be due to the individual perception
of political opportunities (e.g., Meyer, 2004) and, therefore, an
elaborated conception of perceived legitimacy of protest that
considers a broad range of conjunctural and issue-specific factors
is recommended for future research.
To sum up, our findings support the idea that the expression of
multiple politicized identities—their agency—can be understood
to a greater extent when considering the political context and
the rules of the game in which those identities are endorsed
and internalized — that is, the surrounding ideological and
political opportunity structure. However, it is important to
advance our understanding of how various real or virtual
communities, structured around non-contiguous spaces, may
trigger confrontational (potentially radicalized) and persuasive
collective behavior. Our models explained the latter to a greater
extent, but not the former. Finally, we urge collective action
research to continue to operationalize and test how the fluidity of
the political opportunity structure affects the emergence of social
and political identities, and the relationships of compatibility or
opposition between these identities. A more complex framework
capturing the diversity and multiplicity of identities (and
relationships between them: such as perceived compatibility) as
well as their relationship to the political context (the political
background of legitimacy) will better equip us to understand and
predict the paths to social change.
Limitations
Reflecting on the external validity of our findings, we must
exercise caution, due to the cross-sectional nature of our
design, sample characteristics, and our use of self-report explicit
measures of various politically sensitive issues. Therefore,
although we obtained a large general community sample (in two
languages), at a crucial time of the political crisis (shortly after
the passing of laws that restricted people’s right to protest), we
cannot account for the potential selection bias in the sample, or
for the powerful effect of ‘history’ happening at the time of the
study. While we do not wish to assume causal links between,
for example, perceiving protest as legitimate and engaging in
certain types of collective action, we would still like to argue
that it is important to capture the variation in people’s beliefs
about protest in a model predicting collective action. These
variations will naturally be in tune with the changes in the
political structure, and they are likely to have been particularly
relevant for the Ukrainian setting. Further studies at different
times in the development of a political crisis, and in contexts with
variable degrees of democratization, will strengthen our empirical
and theoretical ability to predict collective action.
Secondly, our results support the notion that the perceived
compatibility between multiple identities is an independent
predictor of collective action in addition to the combined effects
of multiple politicized identities. This invites further refinements
of the measures of compatibility and the three identification
types. We assessed identification with three categories by using
two different scales (i.e., item-based for national identification
with Ukraine and the IOS pictorial measures for identifications
with the online protest community and the street movement).
This methodological discrepancy may account for the relative
small covariance of these identifications. It is important to
monitor how our understanding of the effects of multiple
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 642
fpsyg-08-00642 April 24, 2017 Time: 12:56 # 9
Chayinska et al. Collective Action and Multiple Social Identities
identities on collective action may depend on the measurement
type. At the same time, we would note that concerns about
ecological validity should prevail over the exclusive reliance on
conventional measures. It might have been much more intuitively
easy for people to respond with a pictorial measure when thinking
about their self-inclusion in communities that were new and
emerging at the time of the study. At the same time, when
assessing national identification, the more established measures
are perhaps best to assess the depth and strength of people’s group
attachments.
Lastly, we operationalized perceived compatibility using
several questions about the overlap between identity categories
(i.e., referring to their ideological content). We did not
explicitly measure the specific normative content and normative
compatibility of the groups’ political agendas. This measure
might seem, on one hand, comparatively superficial. On the other
hand, its predictive validity indicates that participants responded
to these questions with the two communities (online and street
protest) in mind. Once more, due to the emerging nature of
these group identities and communities of protest, in the midst
of the political instability and crisis, a more in-depth measure
might have been both impractical and unnecessarily complicated.
This leaves room for future research to test whether normative
compatibility between multiple politicized identities explains
other intergroup behaviors, beyond predicting collective action.
CONCLUSION
Summing up, we propose that collective action in the 2014
Euromaidan protests can be interpreted as the congruent
expression of multiple identities that are rendered ideologically
compatible both in online settings and on the street. This
study investigated multiple identities that are related to the
specific political context of a country in transition to democracy,
caught in months-long upheavals and street protests, at a time
when online interactions allowed for increased transnational
mobilization and involvement in politics. The questions were:
how do people negotiate their identities with their country, the
online community of protesters and the street movement? Would
these identities converge to support a concerted political agenda,
thus increasing collective action intentions? Or would they be
redundant in capturing people’s feelings and engagement with
the various groups? In addition, how do these multiple identities
relate to the political opportunity structure where protest itself
was classified as illegal by the government, in a country grappling
with an emergent democratic culture? We found evidence that
the more social groups people “stood for,” the more they “fought”
for their cause and that identifications predicted both forms of
collective action to the degree that people saw the protest and
the online movement as compatible with each other and believed
protest to be legitimate.
We explained persuasive form of collective action to a greater
extent compared to the confrontational form of action. Perhaps,
negotiating multiple identities and looking for ideological
alignment is a strategy that is more easily employed by those with
moderate political agendas. Future research should explore how
the dynamics between multiple identities (creating dissonance
and lack of compatibility) might be employed to temper
engagement in more confrontational or radical political actions.
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